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COMMENTS

LABOR LAw-ToRTs-LIABILITY OF LABOR UNION FOR !Nnuc-

BREACH OF CONTRACT-Among the early common law doctrines
which courts fashioned to resolve labor disputes,1 none was used more
successfully to strike down labor organizations than the tort of inducing breach of contract.2 The cause of action which was born in Lumley
v. Gye 8 grew to titanic proportions in the leading American case of
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co·. v. Mitchell,4 where the organizing campaign of the United Mine Workers of America among coal miners
of the non-union Panhandle coal district of West Virginia was enjoined
and union officials held'liable for inducing breach of "yellow dog'' employment contracts. This decision not only gave springboard impetus
to the use of the "yellow dog'' contract in American industry 5 but
served as an illuminating guide for employers to follow in their legal
battles against the rising tide of trade unionism. Labor unions increasingly found their activities enjoined for inducing breach of employers'
non-labor contr.acts of sale.and purchase, of contracts with individual
ING

1 Other common law doctrines which organized labor met in its early struggle
for recognition are discussed in I TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING,§§ 27-48 (1940), including criminal conspiracy [Pettibone v. United States,
148 U.S. 197, 13 S.Ct. 542 (1893)], civil conspiracy [Mapstrick v. Ramge, 9 Neb.
390, 2 N.W. 739 (1879)]; trespass [Webber v. Barry,,66 Mich. 127, 33 N.W.
389 (1887)]; nuisance [Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union, (C.C. Ohio 1901) 110
F. 698].
2 For a discussion of the tort, see Sayre, "Inducing Breach of Contract," 36 HARV,
L. REv. 663 (1923); Carpenter, "Interference with Contract Relations," 41 HARV,
L. REV. 728 (1928).
It is generally said that the action will lie against one who, with knowledge of
the contract, "maliciously'' induces a breach. "Malice" is satisfied if the defendant
knowingly induced a breach of the contract. South Wales Miners Federation v.
Glamorgan Coal Co., [1905] A.C. 239.
·
8 (Q.B. 1853) 2 E. & B. 216.
4 245 U.S. 229, 38 S. Ct. 65 (1917). For a thorough analysis of the case, see
Cook, "Privileges of Labor Unions," 27 YALE L. J. 779 (1918).
5 A leading commentator on the labor scene estimates that in 1932 over a million
workmen were employed in the United States under ~'yellow dog'' contracts. W1TrE,
THE GoVERNMENT IN LABoR DISPUTES 222 (1932).

. MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 46

employees, and of collective bargaining agreements with rival unions. 6
So e:ffectively had employers wielded this common law doctrine that in
1930 it was characterized as "the doctrine which is being utilized today
in American courts perhaps more extensively than any other, as a
weapon of attack upon labor groups." 7
.During the past fifteen years the law as a whole has moved rapidly
in the direction of favoring union activity. A labor policy expressed in
numerous federal and state laws and important judicial decisions has
generally recognized and protected in the courts the workers' right to
. be free from employer interference, to strike, to engage in peaceful
picketing, and to conduct primary boycotts. Within this liberalizing
judicial concept of the rights of labor, the present status of the action
_against labor unions for inducing breach of contract presents an interesting study of the tenacity of an early common law theory of liability
in labor's mid-twentieth century struggle for a greater share of the
fruits of industry.

A. Inducing Breach of Individual Employment Contracts
Before passage of legislation outlawing or making unenforceable
"yellow dog'' contracts,8 individual employment contracts were generally of three types: term, at-will, and either of these in the form of
a "yellow dog'' contract, by which the worker agreed that during his
employment he would not join an outside un~on. Judicial protection
of the term contract, long recognized at the common law,9 persists
in recent cases to give the employer or the discharged employee a
cause of action against the interfering union.10 Unions have usually
failed in their attempts to justify attempted inducement of breaches.
of term contracts on the ground of self-interest or competition for
available positions. But in Lyons v. United Hotel Employees 11 term
6

See 32 ILL. L. REv. 6II (1938).
Sayre, "Labor and the Courts," 39 YALE L. J. 682, 691 (1930).
8
See, supra, notes 25-27.
.
9
South Wales Miners Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., [1905] A.C. 239;
Mapstrick v. Ramge, 9 Neb. 390, 2 N.W. 739 (1879); Reynolds v. Davis, 198
Mass. 294, 84 N.E. 457 (1908).
.
1 °For example, see Eddyside Co. v. Seibel, (Pa. Super Ct. 1940) 15 A. (2d)
· 691 (labor union officials held liable for inducing breach of contract of dance hall
operators with musicians); Crosby v. Rath, 136 Ohio St. 352, 25 N.E. (2d) 934
· (1939) (injunction against picketing to induce discharge of non-union employees
with whom employer had three months employment contract); The Williams Mfg.
Co. v. United Shoe Workers of America, Local n9, (Ct. of Common Pleas, Scioto
County, Ohio 1937) 1 Lab. Cas., § 18,024 (injunction against picketing to induce
employees under individual employment contracts to leave plaintiff's employ.)
11
(Cal. Super:Ct., San Francisco County, 1941) 4 Lab. Cas. TI' 60, 633.
7
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employment contracts were held to be no bar to picketing to unionize
the employer's plant, justification being found in the interest of the
union in proselyting and improving working conditions. Except for
cautious dicta in a New York decision,12 the Lyons case stands virtually
alone among recent decisions in granting a privilege to a labor union
to interfere with definite term employment contracts.
Where the contractual relationship may be terminated at will,
is true of most employment, the courts have not been in accord as to
the the liability of the interfering union. Since the parties themselves
may terminate the relationsh1p without liability, it is asserted that a
third party may lawfully induce such action.18 And justification may
be found in the bona fide exercise of the right of competition among
workers for employment. Yet many courts in the past have held the
interfering union liable either to the employer 14 or to the displaced
worker.111 The law has not been freed of confusion by recent cases.16
Some change, however, has been effected in the liability of labor
unions in their efforts to secure a closed shop. The former rule, followed in some states, that non-union workers whose employment was
threatened by the execution of a closed shop contract could secure an
injunction against the union,11 has been modified by a more sympathetic

as

12

Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130
(1927), which involved union liability for inducing breach of at-will employment
contracts, where the court said: "Even had it been a valid and subsisting contract,
however, it should be noticed that ••• there is yet no precedent in this court for the
conclusion that a union may not persuade its members or others to end contracts of
employment where the final intent lying behind the attempt is to increase its influence."
Id. at 266.
18
See Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130
(1927); Diamond Black Coal Co. v. U. M. W. A., 188 Ky. 477, 222 S.W. 1079,
(1920); lnterborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N.Y. 65, 159 N.E. 863
(1928), discussed in 41 HARv. L. REv. 770 (1928).
14
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 38 S. Ct. 65 (1917);
Patterson Glass Co. v. Thomas, 41 Cal. App. 559, 183 P. 190 (1919); 84 A.L.R.
43 (1933).
15
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 7 (1915); 84 A.L.R. 43 (1933).
16
See Chatanooga Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers, (Tenn. Ch. Ct., Hamilton Co.,
1947) 19 L.R.R.M. 2513 (picketing for a closed shop enjoined on the dual theory
of inducing breach of employment contracts and as violative of the N.L.R.A. provision
than"an employer may not force employees to join a union); Suchodolski v. A.F. of
L., 127 N.J.Eq. 511, 14 A. (2d) 51 (1940) (plaintiff-employee's interest in his job
held to be a bar to defendant-window washer union's picketing of plaintiff's employer
to force plaintiff to join a union).
17
Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900); Bogni v. Perroti,
224 Mass. 152, 112 N.E. 853 (1916); Keith Theatre, Inc v. Vachon, 134 Me.
392, 187 A. 692 (1936); Wilson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers Union, 123
N.J.Eq. 347, 197 A. 720 (1938).
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judicial view of the legality of the closed shop which finds justification
in the self-interest of union members in obtaining employment and
in meeting their employers on equal terms in collective bargaining
negotiations.18
The protection given to "yellow dog'' contracts by the Supreme
Court in the Hitchman case 19 was quickly and effectively emulated by
state courts. In Callan v. Cotton Mills 20 the Georgia court went so
far as to create a binding "yellow _dog" contract out of an employer's
announcement that no one who belonged to a union would be employed and the employees' implied consent through subsequent retention of empfoyment. The New York 21 and Ohio 22 courts, however, refused to enjoin interference with "yellow dog'' contracts. Des- .
pite adverse decisions in the Adair 28 and Coopage 24 cases, the legis. lative attack against the "yellow dog'' contract continued until today the
Norris-LaGuardia act,25 sections 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) of the
'

18

'

Williams v. Quill, 277 N.Y. 1, 12 N.E. (2d) 547 (1938) (injunction denied
to restrain defendant employer from discharging employees pursuant to a closed shop
agreement, on the theory that self-interest of the union in obtaining employment for
its members justified its action); Hamer v. Nashaweria Mills, 315 Mass. 160, 52 N.E.
(2d) 22 (1943) (court refused to enjoin enforcement of closed shop contract, emphasizing that the union was ready to admit to membership all employees).
See generally on the subject of the legality of the closed shop, 160 A.L.R. 918
(1946).
If the union discriminates against applicants for membership under a closed shop
contract, the union may be compelled to give up its demand for a closed shop
[Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. (2d) 746, 155 P. (2d) 343 (1944)]; or may be forced
to admit into the union qualified applicants [James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. (2d)
721, 155 P. (2d) 329 (1944)]; or may be liable in damages to the discharged em- ,
ployee [4 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, § 810 and 8n (1939) ].
19
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 38 S. Ct. 65 (1917);
see notes 4 and 5, supra.
20
149,Ga. 119, 99 S.E. 300 (1919).
21
Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Green, 131 Misc. 682, 227 N.Y.S. 258
(1928) (two year contract with "yellow dog" provision held unenforceable); Exchange
Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130 (1927) (''yellow dog''
provision held unenforceable for lack: of consideration).
22
Hamilton Tailoring Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, (Ct. of Common
Pleas, Hamilton Co. 1935) 4 Ohio Op. 295 (six months employment contract with
''yellow dog'' provision held unenforceable).
28
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 277 (1908).
24
Coopage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 240 (1915).
25
29 U.S.C.A. (1947) §§ 101-115.
The case qf Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 61 S. Ct. 845
(1941), would seem to have put at rest the question of the constitutionality of anti,yellow dog legislation, for, in sustaining an N .L.R.B.. order finding employer discriminating against applicants, for employment because of their union affiliation, the
Court said: "The course of decisions in this court since Adair r,,. United States • •• and
Coopage r,,. Kansas • • ., have completely sapped those cases. of their authority." Id.
at 187.
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National Labor Relations Act,26 and numerous state.laws 21 have outlawed or rendered unenforceable this type of onerous contract. The
paucity of recent cases of labor union liability for interference with
"yellow dog'' contracts attests to the virtual demise of a widely-condemned and once-powerful employer weapon to perpetuate the open
shop.
B. Inducing Breach of Non-Labor Contracts of Sale and Purchase

When unions have pushed their demands for better working conditions to the point of a strike, picketing, or a boycott, they have often
been confronted in the courts by suits brought by an employer or his
customers for interference with outstanding contracts. Since the aim
of the striking workers is to weaken the economic position of the em.::
ployer and thus compel acceptance of their demands, the strike, if
effective, naturally interferes with the contract interests of the employer. Shall, then, the strike or other concerted activity be forbidden
because it induces breach of contract? The affirmative answer handed
down in many decisions in the past has often condemned even incidental, or resulting, interference by the union with ,contracts of sale
and purchase between the employer and third parties to the labor
dispute. 28 The logical result of such reasoning is to hold unlawful all
strikes when the employer is doing business under contract.29 It is
doubtful that courts today would hold that incidental interference with
outstanding contracts is a basis for outlawing union activity which is
otherwise lawful.80
Where interference with employer third-party contracts is the
primary, rather than the incidental, result of the labor dispute, labor
has quite consistently been found liable. Usually this type of contractual
disturbance results from economic pressures brought to bear upon third
parties .doing business with the employer, through secondary strikes,
boycotts, and picketing. Earlier decisions almost uniformly condemned
26

29 U.S.C.A. (1947) §§ 151-166.
See 2 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, § 459 (1940
and 1947 Cum. Supp.), where the author cites statutes of twenty-five states aimed at
"yellow dog'' contracts.
28
Carroll v. Chesapeake & Ohio Coal Agency Co., (C.C.A. 4th, 1903) 124 F.
305; Vonnegut Machinery Co. v. Toledo Machine & Tool Co., (C.C. Ohio 1920)
263 F. 192; Quinlivan v. Dail-Overland Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1921) 274 F. 56; R.
and W. Shop, Inc. v. Scully, 98 Conn. 1, 118 A. 55 (1922).
29
PROSSER, TORTS, § 104 (1941).
80
See 4 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, § 809 (1939), where such incidental interference
is declared privileged. Also see 32 ILL. L. REv. 6u (1938), where a distinction
is drawn between "incidentally causing" and "intentionally procuring" breach of
contract.
27
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these secondary pressures, usually on the ground that unlawful means ,
were being exerted to ruin the business of a neutral,31 and sometimes
on the theory of conspiracy to induce customers of the employer to
breach their contracts with him.82 Labor's plea of justification, that the
customer is an economic ally of the employer who benefits from the
protested unfair working conditions, made but slight impression upon
the courts. The New York doctrine allowing secondary picketing and
boycotts when there is "unity of interest" between employer and
customer, was a notable, albeit qualified, exception.88
Under the Thorn,hill 84 and Wohl 35 cases the Supreme Court has
extended the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment's free.speech
guarantee to peaceful picketing. This principle has been delineated by
'the Ritter's Cafe 36 case to exclude from its shelter the "conscription
of neutrals" which a state has chosen to prohibit, and by Milk Wagon
Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies 87 to
exclude picketing which has become so enmeshed ·with acts of violence
that the possibility of peaceful persuasion has disappeared. Most current state decisions have recognized the free speech principle and have
protected peaceful picketing although the union activity obviously
caused a breach of employer-customer contracts.88 But several recent
81
Fink & Son v. Butchers Union No. 422, 84 N.J. Eq. 638, 95 A. 182 (1915);
Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mas~. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906).
82
Beattie v. Callanan, 82 App. Div. 7, 81 N.Y.S. 413 (1903); Parker Paint
& Wall Paper Co. v. Local Union No. 813, 87 W. Va. 631, 105 S.E. 911 (1921);
contra, J. F. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 P. 1027
(1908).
38
See Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, II N.E. (2d) 910 (1938), where
the picketing took place at the retail stores of customers of the employer-disputant.
The court was careful to state that the picketing was directed against the non-unionmade product rather than against the retailer. That the New York Court has cautiously
maintained this distinction, see Chapman v. Doe, 255 App. Div. 893, 7 N.Y.S. (2d)
470 (1938) (injunction against picketing of beer distributor to compel truck drivers
to join union); People v. Bellows, 281 N.Y. 67, 22 N.E. (2d) 238 (1939) (conviction for disorderly conduct of pickets of retail store which had purchased neon
signs from a company employing members of a rival union).
84
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 8 8, 60 S. Ct. 73 6 ( I 940).
85
Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 313 U.S. 548,
61 S. Ct. 1108 (1941) (certiorari granted and injunction of the New York Court
of Appeals summarily reversed) 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816 (1942) (rehearing of the
judgment of reversal).
86
315 U.S. 722, 62 S. Ct. ·807 (1942).
87
312 U.S. 287, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941).
88
Lo Bianco v. Holt, 189 Misc. 113, 70 N.Y.S. (2d) 33 (1947) (picketing of
customers of plaintiff partners in business, although plaintiffs conducted business without employees); Singer v. Kirsch Beverages, 271 App. Div. 801, 65 N.Y.S. (2d)
400. (1946) (union stopped members from working for employer selling beverages
to non-union peddlers); Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. Intl. Brotherhood of Team-
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state court cases involving.secondary picketing and boycotts have sought
to avoid the result of the Supreme Court decisions by disclaiming the
existence of a labor dispute or by declaring unlawful the objective of
union activity, using the doctrine of inducing breach of contractual
relations at least as a makeweight to sustain the case for union liability.39
In defining the scope of the privilege to interfet'e with contractual
relations by peaceful picketing of third parties, the courts have drawn
a distinction between two types of outstanding contracts. In the Ritter's
Cafe case 40 defendant union picketed plaintiff's restaurant to induce
him to break his contract with a non-union contractor for the erection
of a building twenty-four blocks from the restaurant. The Supreme
Court affirmed a Texas injunction, over the plea of the union that
picketing was protected by the free speech guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment, on the ground that, despite his contractual relations with
one of the disputants, Ritter was a "neutral" whose business was
"wholly outside the context of the real dispute." In People v. Mitller 41
the union picketed the purchaser of a burglar alarm system sold to
plaintiff by a supplier with whom the union ha:d a dispute. Although
there was a contract for service and maintenance between purchaser
and supplier, and the purchaser would have to break that agreement
if it granted the union's demand, the New York court refused to grant
an injunction, citing the Wohl case as authority. Under this view, the
free speech guarantee privileges interference by secondary picketing
with the ordinary contracts of purchase and service between employer
and customer, but does not extend the privilege to contracts not directly
related to the business of the person against whom pressure is brought. 42
sters, 27 Cal. (2d) 599, 165 P. (2d) 891 (1946) (through circulation of "unfair
list," striking union urged plaintiff's customers not to purchase plaintiff's product, in
order to secure for the union a closed shop).
39
Dinoffria v. Intl. Teamsters Union, 331 Ill. App. 129, 72 N.E. (2d) 635
(1947) (injunction against picketing and boycotting of plaintiff's suppliers to compel
plaintiffs, independent service station operators, to join union); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 806, 185 Misc. 409, 57 N.Y.S. (2d) 24
(1945) (injunction against picketing of plaintiff's purchasers to induce plaintiff to
hire union truck drivers).
4
°Carpenters and Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722,
62 S. Ct. 807 (1942).
41
286 N.Y. 281, 36 N.E. (2d) 206 (1941).
42
The question of the union's liability in damages for inflicting economic losses
upon employer and customer in these privileged areas would still seem to be open~
Although one accepts the premise of these cases, that picketing is the mere expression
of free speech at the place where it is most effective to change economic relations,
it would seem that conveying information by picketing is subject to the same restrictions
as any other exercise of free speech. If slanderous, fraudulent, or intimidating state-

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

In summary, the use of the doctrine of inducement of breach of
contract as a basis for enjoining union interference with employercustomer agreements has been seriously curtailed by the identification,
of picketing with free speech, although the theory has sometimes been
invoked, at least as a makeweight, to enjoin picketing which is intended
to cause breach of contracts unrelated to the business of the person who
is the object' of the picketing. Although mµons today may be found
liable for interference by non-picketing activity with the employer's
outstanding contracts of sale and purchase, a review of the decisions
shows that during the last decade the doctrine has seldom been utilized
in such cases as an independent basis for :fixing union liability.

.'

C. Inducing Breach of Collective Bargaining Agreements
When an employer has executed a collective bargaining agreement
with Union A, what liability attaches to the efforts of Union B to
displace that contract by winning recognition as the workers' bargaining
agent? Earlier decisions generally disapproved of inter-unon,disputes,
especially wl,ien the defehdant union was an "outside" union,43 although
there is authority that if some of the employees belonged to the defendant union, relief would be refused.44 Interference with collective
agreements terminable at will was sometimes justified, on the ground
of legitimate competition.45 Prior to the Supreme Court's identification
of picketing with free speech,46 the case of Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v.
Kaplan 47 was outstanding in its declaration of the right of a rival union
to interfere with a collective bargaining contract. The court denied
the employer injunctive relief, asserting that: "Unquestionably defendant in picketing these three theaters was actuated by a desire to
ments are published by picketing, or if picketing results in economic injury to employer-customer trade relations such as to produce union liability on general principles,
it may be contended that the free speech privilege against prior restraint should not
preclude recovery of damages in a tort action against the union. The question is
whether the free speech- doctrine of the Thornhill case protects not only the right
to picket peacefully but also protects the union from liability for intentional infliction
of economic injury caused by such picketing.
,
48
Central Metal Products Corp. v. O'Brien, (N.D. Ohio 1922) 278 F. 827;
Tracey v. Osborne, 226 Mass. 25, Il4 N.E. 959 (1917); Walchak v. Weisman, 145
Misc. 268, 259 N.Y.S. 225 (1932); Goyette v. Watson, 245 Mass. 577, 140 N.E.
285 (1923).
44
Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 A. 3'27 (1903); Herzog v. Cline,' 131
Misc. 816, 227 N.Y.S. 462 (1927).
45
Steam Fitters v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902); Nann v.
Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690 (1931).
46
See notes 34 and 35, supra.
41
259 N.Y. 405, 182 N.E. 63 (1932).
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improve labor conditions, as to wages, hours, numbers of employees,
and conditions of work, although incidental disadvantage to the employer might result. 'R~ulting injury is incidental and must be endured."' 48 To the plaintiff's assertion that the picketing was intended
to cause a breach of his contract with the other union, the court said:
"No one was asked to break any contract.... [The picketing] might
make it unprofitable for the employer to go on with the contract, but
to state fairly and truly to the public that the' conduct of the employer
is socially objectionable is no persuasion to break a contract." 49
But in the case law of its period, the Stillwell Theatre decision
stood in the minority and, indeed, it may not even state the New York
law today. 50 In favor of prevention of interference with collective
agreements by a rival union has been the unenviable position of the
employer. Although he may stand willing to bargain with representatives of his workers, he is caught in the cross fire of an interunion dispute whose first casualty is often the employer's business
relations. "The plaintiff [employer] has thus been placed in a dilemma.
If it accedes to the demands of the minority union, it breaches its contract with the certified union. If it attempts to abide by the terms of
said contract. . • , it has a strike on its hands and picketing and other
activity that go with it. It seems to the court that since the picketing
by the minority union is, in effect, an attempt to force the breach of
an agreement. . . , this court of equity should prevent the irreparable
injury which flows therefrom." 51
These are the conflicting interests, which tug at courts in the litigation
of inter-union disputes: (r) the employer wants to be saved from economic losses caused by a quarrel in which he is a suffering neutral;
( z) the union which is a party to _the collective bargaining agreement
has a valuable and, perhaps, hard-won interest for which it demands
protection; (3) the minority union asserts its right to negotiate a contract in behalf of its members and to enlist new members to attempt
to supplant its rival. In balancing these interests most courts, until
quite recently, protected the first and second interests at the expense
48

Id. at 408.
Id. at 412.
5
°Cf. Dinney & Robbins, Inc. v. Davis, 290 N.Y. 101, 48 N.E. (2d) 280
(1943), where the court enjoined picketing by a rival union after the employer had
entered into a collective agreement with another union, because "the court will not
be compelled to force breach of a valid contract between employer and its employees
when. made as a result of collective bargaining."
151
Euclid Candy Co. of New York, Inc. v. Summa, 174 Misc. 19, 19 N.Y.S.
(2d) 382 (1940), affd., 259 App. Div. 1081, 21 N.Y.S. (2d) 614 (1940).
49
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of the third by finding the subsisting employer-union contract a bar
to action by a rival union which might lead to its breach.
What has been the effect of the free speech concept of picketing
on inter-union agression? In Millers, Inc. v. Journeymen Tailors
Union 52 the Supreme Court in a memorandum decision reversed the
judgment of the New Jersey court 53 in enjoining a C.I.O. union from
peacefully picketing plaintiff, who had entered into a closed shop
contract with an A. F. L. union. Most recent state decisions follow the
Journeymen Tailors Union case and emphasize the protection afforded
picketing by the Fourteenth Amendment. 54
When the union under contract has been certified under a labor
relations act an additional difficulty confronts the employer. The
Wagner Act 55 cast upon the employer the duty of bargaining with the
certified union, 56 and forbade his entering into a closed shop contract
except with the organization representing a majority of employees. 57
The Supreme Court has had no occasion to determine the legality of
attempts to interfere with a collective agreement made with a certified
union; but a federal district court 18 recently denied an injunction
against strike and picketing in this situation, on the grounds that the
defendant union had the right to try to change the status quo and
that plaintiff had not complied with the requirements of the NorrisLaGuardia Act.59 Most state courts which have passed on this issue
have held that certification bars attempts to interfere 'With the employer-union contract,6° because if riot enjoined the activity of the
minority union will cause a breach of contract and force the employer
to violate his statntory duty to bargain only' with the certified union.
52

312 U.S. 658, 61 S.8t. 732 (1941).
128 N.J. Eq. 162, 15 A. (2d) 822 (1940).
64
Blossom Dairy Co. v. Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 125 W. Va. 165, 23
S.E. (2d) 645 (1942); Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 27 Cal. (2d) 599, 165 P. (2d) 891 (1946); Washington v. Superior Court
for Pierce County, 24 Wash. (2d) 314, 164 P. (2d) 662 (1945).
55
29 U.S.C.A. (1947) §§ 151-166.
56 Jd. § 8 (5).
51 Id. § 8 (3).
118
Yoerg Brewing Co. v. Brennan, (D.C. Minn. 1945) 59 F. Supp. 625.
59
29 U.S.C.A.· (1947) §§ ro1-II5.
The effect of the anti-injunction statutes upon the subject under discussion
is, of course, important but is beyond the scope of this comment. For an excellent
analysis of anti-injunction statutes' effect upon actions against labor unions for inducing
breach of contract, see 32 ILL. L. REv. 6II (1938).
60
Markham & Callow, Inc. v. Intl. Woodcutters of America, 170 Ore. 517, 135
P. (2d) 727 (1943); R. H. White Co. v. Murphy, 310 Mass. 510, 38 N.E. (2d)
685 (1942); Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union, 288 N.Y.
188, 42 N.E. (2d) 480 (1942); See note, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1200 (1941).
58

COMMENTS

399

Although these reasons may be sound for granting the employer relief,
it is submitted that an injunction should not issue upon the petition
of a certified union to prevent peaceful bona fide competitive activity
of a rival union.61 To issue an injunction merely to protect the rights
of the certified union would frequently deprive the union of the only
effective way it may combat its rival. When a union seeks to enjoin
acts of a rival group it would seem that, in the absence of illegal action
directed against it or its members, the fact that such acts tend to cause
breach of a contract between the plaintiff union and the employer is
a circumstance which must yield to the superior privilege of the defendant union to protect and strengthen itself.62
Passage of the Taft-Hartley Act 63 has changed the federal law
applicable to inter-union disputes. Section 8(a)(4)(B) and (C) makes
it an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in or to induce others
to engage in a strike or handling boycott, in order to compel "any
other employer" to bargain with or recognize a labor union as bargaining agent unless such union has been certified by the board, or to
compel "any employer" to recognize or bargain with a labor group
when another organization has been duly certified. Insofar as these
provisions do not conflict with the constitutional right to picket peacefully, the minority union is now made liable for engaging in activity
which interferes with subsisting collective bargaining agreements.64
61
National Labor Relations Board certification does not create a "federal right"
in the certified union, enforceable against a rival union by injunction in the federal
courts. United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers v. Intl. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) 115 F. (2d) 488; Blankenship v. Kurfman, (C.C.A.
7th, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 450.
62
Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 305, 174 N.E. 690 (1931) (injunction at suit of
plaintiff union, which had entered collective agreement with employer, denied against
rival union's picketing, justification being found in defendant's union objective of
raising standard of living for workers in the industry) ; McKay v. Retail Union No.
1067, 16 Cal. (2d) 311, 106 P. (2d) 373 (1940) (denial of injunction sought by
employee group against defendant union's picketing for a closed shop, the court finding
that the closed shop is legitimate means of maintaining the combined bargaining power
of the workers); Montgomery Ward E. Assn. v. Retail Clerk I. P. Assn., (Cal. D.C.
1941) 38 F. Supp. 321 (petitioning union, which had filed petition for certification,
denied injunction against picketing and boycotting of defendant union, on the ground
that picketing is an expression of free speech by which defendant union could win
converts to its cause).
63
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT oF 1947, 29 U.S.C.A.•(1947) §§ 141197•
64
Clearly such action by a union is an unfair labor practice which is outlawed by
§ 8(b)(4) of the new act. Further, under Title III, § 303(b), the defendant union
may be liable to both the employer and the certified union in money damages for
injury to economic interests caused by the unlawful activity.
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In summary, the free speech doctrine has apparently immunized
from injunction peaceful picketing which attempts to displace or cause
a breach of existing agreements between the employer and a rival labor
organization. However, where the union has been certified under a
labor relations act, and the employer has sought injunctive relief
against such picketing, the majority of state courts which have passed
on the question have not been willing to extend the free speech doctrine
to protect the right of the defendant union to picket under such circumstances, utillzing the theory of inducing breach of contract as at least an
alternative ground for decision. Although there are few decisions
directly in point, it is doubtful if equitable relief should be extended to
the certified union against peaceful attempts of a rival labor organization
to change the status quo, even though the protested activity is directed
to inducing breach of an existing collective agreement.
@

.D. Conclusion
The privilege of labor unions to cause breach of contracts during
labor disputes is inextricably bound within the broader policy question
of labor's privilege to inflict economic injury in the pursuit of its aims.
The Restatement of Torts gives workers a privilege to inflict losses
upon an employer, including those caused by interference with contracts, if the means and purposes of the action are legitimate.65 Dicta
in Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier spelled out an absolute privilege in these
words: "The interest of labor in improving working conditions is of
sufficient social importance to justify peaceful labor tactics otherwise
lawful, though they have the e:ffect of inducing breaches of contract
between employer ~d employee or employer and customer." 66 Judges
today declare with increasing frequency that the question of a union's
privilege to invade contractual relations -involves such considerations
of economic policy that the legislature, rather than the courts, must
determine the "allowable area of economic conflict." 67 In the Labor
65

4 TORTS RESTATEMENT, §. 775 (1939).
Id., § 809 provides that workers are not liable for losses caused a third person
when their action is not directed against that person and is privileged against the person
a1; whom it was directed.
66
18 Cal. (2d) 33 at 35, 112 P. (2d) 631 at 632 (1941).
61
See McKay v. Retail Union, No.- 1067, 16 Cal. (2d) 3n, 106 P. (2d) 373
(1940)_; Fur forkers, Union, Local No. 72 v. Fur Workers Union, (App. D.C.
1939) 105 F. ·\2d) 1.
"The legislative department of government alone, and· not the judicial department,
has the power to determine the limits of permissible conduct in the labor field of
economic conflict, and to declare duties and define limits of conduct where a new
social and economic condition arises and demands change." Los Angeles County Fair
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Disputes Act of r906 68 the British Parliament has delineated that
area by granting labor organizations absolute immunity from liability
for inducing breaches of employment contracts during labor disputes.
Since in industrial disputes it is almost inevitable that breaches of contract
will occur, it seems highly desirable that the legislative branch shall prescribe the scope and extent of that privilege as part of its general
policy governing management-labor conflicts. Congress has undertaken
to do this to a limited extent in the Taft-Hartley Act. But until the
legislature has determined the full extent of the privilege, labor remains confronted, in its struggle for a better' economic position, with a
still-virile legal theory of the early common law.

Ir~ M. Price, II, S.Ed.

Assn. v. Pomona Valley Central Labor Council, (Cal. Super. Ct.,-Los Angeles Co. 1941)
8 L.R.R.M. 1109 at IIIO.
68 6 Edw. 7, c. 47 (1906).

